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Aesthetics and Border Lines
“Design” as a Liminal Case
Morten Kyndrup
0
Aesthetics, of course, is a discipline, but “aesthetics”, “the aesthetic”, and 
“aes theticity” are also concepts. The question of the border lines of aes-
thetics thus necessarily implies one’s general approach to the status of 
concepts. I shall therefore briefly sketch out some more general pre-con-
ditions which may be necess ary in order to understand my approach to 
these problems.
First of all: Concepts are names. We use concepts to name phenomena 
and substances we meet in our reality. Lots of problems and confusions 
can be ident ified in the business of naming. We have, on the one hand, the 
case of the same substance with different names (called synonymy) and, 
on the other, we have the opposite problem of the same name designat-
ing different substances – the case of so-called polysemy. We have proper 
names designating in principle one and only one phenomenon, so-called 
rigid designators (which was Kripke’s term) and we have appellatives, 
names for groups or types of phenomena sharing certain properties, for 
instance “chair”, “house”, or “conference”. Consequently, we of course also 
have blurred or changing border lines between categories, both in general 
and pertaining to singular cases.
At a general level, I would characterize my approach as conceptualist 
within the framework of what has been called “semiotic realism”. This 
approach is nominalist in the sense that it emphasizes the difference be-
tween our naming and the reality it refers to. At the same time, it is a 
realist one in the sense that it considers the naming system (language, the 
concepts) as objectively existing, that is: part of the reality outside us as 
individuals.
I am not here going to recall the whole historical discussion of univer-
sals in philosophy. Sufficient in this connection is to state the fact that the 
interesting issue in this discussion is not the names as such: Interesting 
are the substances they designate, “reality”. In principle, you can change 
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a name just by decision. You cannot change the world by decision. To 
the extent concepts have become integrate parts of our naming system, 
they form part of our reality as well, and thus become subjectively un-
changeable. This does not mean that concepts and their references do 
not change. Indeed they do. Everything in the world of humans is subject 
to change. The cadences of change, however, are different. Different ca-
dences of change in different areas co-exist and interfere mutually into 
their respective semiotic domains: the properties of human nature in a 
biological sense; western civilisation; modernity’s discursive distinction 
between areas; the division of labour between men and women; the status 
and extension of judgements in everyday life; the width of the leg on blue 
jeans, etc.
Although, of course, all kinds of conflations, cross-overs, and mis under-
standings, both subjectively and objectively, are indeed notorious in this 
ever changing semantic landscape, it is a core part of my strategic ap-
proach to any discussion of conceptual delimitations that no confusions or 
ambiguities in this landscape are coincidental. I.e., also obvious contradic-
tions in terms have their explanations, form part of some kind of rational-
ity – or at least have done so earlier on. Another fact – perhaps banal 
but still important to keep in mind in this connection – is that concepts 
without limits are useless and at the bottom line literally meaningless. In 
fact, the most interesting part of concepts may indeed be their border line 
problems. Border line problems pertaining to concepts are not some kind 
of disease which should be cured. Semantic liminality and ambiguity is 
the very source of conceptual life.
I
But back to aesthetics. The history of aesthetics has indeed been dominat-
ed by liminality problems. This is completely natural, and even more so 
given the fact that aesthetics is a “new” concept forming part of modern-
ity’s differentiation processes, transforming its heritage of traditional phi-
losophy of beauty into the upcoming creation of discursive differences.
The fact that the existence of border line problems to the concept of 
aesthetics throughout its lifetime have been natural and explainable does 
not imply, however, that all of these problems have contributed equally 
productively to the development of conceptual clarity. I shall start out 
by calling attention to two interconnected areas of semantic liminality 
conflict pertaining to aesthetics – both of which are natural parts of the 
concept’s process of identifying its own semantic position, but which over 
time have become decisively counter-productive in certain respects. The 
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first one pertains to the territory of aesthetics, the second one to the mo-
dality of the discipline’s approach.
The territorial one concerns aesthetics’ relationship to art – in particu-
lar what has been called the “marriage” between art and the aesthetic 
formed by Romanticism in the early history of the concept of aesthetics. 
This marriage, which I have dealt with elsewhere, apparently marked an 
enormous expansion of the aesthetic, linking it to art’s seemingly trans-
discursive auratic sphere. But this was also an expansion, as it has become 
increasingly clear over the last half century, which constituted a kind of 
prison or iron curtain for aesthetics, keeping it captured behind the pali-
sades of art’s autonomy, delimiting it to this conceptual partnership with 
art. Among other things, the consequence of this partnership was that 
aesthetics was bound to share arts’ conflictual relationship to theory and 
Wissenschaft.
This consequence is closely related to the other problem I want to un-
derline here, the modal one. This problem consists in the fact that aesthet-
ics as a discipline to a large extent has considered it its task to pronounce 
aesthetic judgements. Once again, historically this task implied an eleva-
tion of the discipline’s status. By linking itself institutionally to the object-
bound aspect of the aesthetic judgement, aesthetics gained a surplus of 
authority and enhanced an elevation of status in relation to everyday-life. 
But in the long run, this very same privilege would undermine aesthet-
ics’ authority as a contributor to objective (i.e.: intended value-free, un-
biased) scientific knowledge about the phenomenon of aesthetic value. 
The privilege of expressing preferences concerning aesthetic value fur-
nished aesthetics as a discipline with a touch of subjectivity which was 
to become a decisive obstacle in the recognition of its status as value-free 
knowledge or science. This systematic confusion of discipline and object 
for long kept aesthetics in a conceptual childhood of some sorts. The fact 
that aesthetic relations are value based and value producing and have the 
aesthetic judgement as their core activity does by no means imply that the 
discipline studying these values and judgements should itself pronounce 
that kind of judgements, or for that matter, even if so, should possess 
any kind of privilege concerning the direction and content of such judge-
ments.
II
A third liminality problematic, reappearing again and again in the his-
tory of the concept of aesthetics, is dealing with the question of where 
aesthetic quality is to be found or produced: In the object or in the subject. 
Aesthetics and Border Lines
27
This problem has been dealt with thoroughly and it has frequently led to 
approaches resembling un-intermediated double strategies. Consider for 
example David Hume’s On the Standard of Taste (1757) arguing in favour 
of general standards and yet rejecting the beauty as a property of the ob-
ject. Or, similarly, Denis Diderot’s distinction in the Encyclopédie between 
“beau réel” and “beau aperçu”, real and experienced beauty (1752). This 
indeed is a long story. Its apparent aporias is anything but counterpro-
ductive since this problematic touches upon the substantial part of what 
the aesthetic is about. As has become increasingly clear, aesthetic value 
is neither exclusively subject-bound nor object-bound. Aesthetic value is 
subjective, but it is strictly referring to an object. I.e.: Aesthetic value is 
relational and singular. In his book, La relation esthétique, Gérard Genette 
phrases it that the adjective “aesthetic” is “not dispositional but resulta-
tive”. And he continues, “it is not the object that makes the relation aes-
thetic, it is the relation that makes the object aesthetic” (op.cit. p. 18).
If this is an adequate understanding of the nature of aesthetic value, 
it raises fundamental questions to the scholarly approach performed by 
aesthetics. If, one might ask, aesthetic value is always in this sense singu-
lar, would that not reduce aesthetics to a sub-discipline of sociology (i.e. 
mapping empirically existing judgements of taste) or at least delimit its 
activities to a study of the very mechanism of the aesthetic judgement? 
Again, the answer will be yes and no. We might illustrate the problem 
with a parallel: The case of traffic accidents. Traffic accidents are always 
singular events, happening in a specific configuration of time and space. 
In that sense, real knowledge about traffic accidents must be based on 
their sociology and on empirically founded insights into their mecha-
nisms. But besides this, a third level of knowledge occurs. That is the one 
of analyzing and calculating potential risks of traffic accidents, based on 
the knowledge of traffic, of patterns of reaction, of technical properties of 
roads and of vehicles etc. Given this knowledge, one can analyze the prob-
able physiognomy of a given potential traffic accident related to given 
times, places, and involved instances.
This, of course, may be a somewhat farfetched allegory. The purpose of 
it, however, is to emphasize the fact that, on the one hand, aesthetic rela-
tions indeed are singular and unique as such. On the other hand, objectual 
(and situational) properties may be analyzed and categorized in regard to 
their ability to produce distinctive conditions for specific aesthetic value 
production. In particular, this may be analyzed by using the core con-
cepts of reception theory, of so-called model senders and receivers. We 
seemingly perceive all objects with which we enter into aesthetic rela-
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tions, as being in a specific sense addressed to us. Many of them, artworks 
for instance, actually are addressed to us. By sorting out the instances of 
embedded or implied senders/receivers, an operation of analyzing vir-
tual aesthetic values of objects becomes manageable. Thereby, it becomes 
poss ible to operate with properties like implied intentional aesthetic value 
as an also intensional (with an s) property of a given artefact.
III
Now let us return to the issue of limits. Given a status of the aesthetic as 
“resultative”, there may indeed exist such a thing as a territory of aesthetic 
objects, that is, objects that have become aesthetic. The above mentioned 
implied aesthetic relationality might make it possible to define yet an-
other territory of the aesthetic, perhaps as a region or a zone of the former, 
and either way in some sense connected to it.
Decisive, however, is the fact that these territories obviously do not 
form part of what in a mathematical sense is called division in classes – or 
of the way we usually understand divisions of land in territories, for in-
stance nations. This is when any piece of land belongs to one and only one 
territory. In the case of the aesthetic, on the other hand, the border lines of 
these territories refer to only one out of many possible logics of division. 
They are in other words not exhaustive. They are not even stable. This also 
holds true for a territorial division based on a distinction between types 
of relationality. Divisions based on other kinds of relationality would thus 
result in alternative territories with other border lines.
In short, “aesthetic” is not an exhaustive predicate. It is not a stable, 
objectual quality which identifies a given object and makes it irreversibly 
belong to a certain class of objects. “Aesthetic” should rather be defined as 
a “modelling operation” as it has recently been proposed by Wolfgang Iser 
following a concept of W. C. Wimsatt. 
Now, a brief look at the case of design may be illustrative as to what 
this means.
When we perceive a given object as a piece of design, we do, on the 
one hand, let it stand out as something singular, and we acknowledge its 
objectual form and its distinctive appearance as if this very form was ad-
dressing exactly us, about to perceive this singular form as good or bad. 
We clearly establish an aesthetic relation to this object, pronouncing a 
judgement of taste which is singular and personal. Interesting here (as 
compared to for instance artworks) is the fact that a piece of design may 
obviously be the result of a mass production, but that this does not dimin-
ish its unique value or status as a singular, desirable object for us.
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On the other hand, this approach to a given object, perceiving its form 
as something addressing us and thus forming the basis of a judgment of 
taste is obviously only one possible approach among several others. We 
might approach a desk lamp, a car, or a laptop from an aesthetic point of 
view, but we might also approach and discuss each of them within other 
categories, such as functional properties, mechanical quality, price etc. 
The point here, once again, is that these different properties or classes of 
objectual qualities each correspond to or match a specific approach (or 
modelling operation, if you will), and that, although these approaches all 
refer to the same object, they have nothing to do with each other in the 
sense that they could represent a division in territories. We do actually 
pos sess the ability to switch from an aesthetic approach to an alterna-
tive, for instance a use value-orientated one in any given situation, and 
of course we may combine the result of our judgements and analyses at 
different levels, but you cannot find such a thing as a border line zone 
within the object between its (implied or realized) aesthetic qualities and 
its other layers or qualitative properties.
In the case of design, we find it spontaneously unproblematic to switch 
between modes of approach or modelling operation, and we would never 
dream of making the assessment that the aesthetic qualities of a given 
object were exhaustively representative for its properties as a whole. We 
might accept to drive in a beautifully designed car with a lousy mechani-
cal quality or to sit in a terrific chair that hurts our back – but we would 
know distinctively what we did. Or put otherwise: We would know that 
other qualities are naturally to be found in any given object than the one 
represented by the aesthetic approach.
IV
My point, of course, is that this distinction between qualitative approaches 
and consequently between functional objectual qualities remains true also 
in the case of artworks. Artworks may be perceived as aesthetic objects 
and thus qualified and judged as such. But they may also be perceived in 
other ways, at other levels, through other channels, for instance in terms 
of sources of historical or conceptual knowledge about civilization, about 
themselves, about their origin ator, about specific events etc. In other 
words, art theory (and art history in a wider sense) is something differ-
ent from aesthetic theory. It is true, of course, that the historical process 
of elaborating Modernity’s aesthetic relationality is closely and delicately 
connected to the possibilities offered by autonomous art. The confusion 
of the boundaries of art and those of the aesthetic and consequently of 
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“philosophy of art” and “aesthetics” are thus indeed historically under-
standable and explainable. But this fact does not make the confusion less 
counterproductive from today’s perspective. Its counter-productivity is, 
as sketched out here, not least due to the fact that the confusion of terri-
tories and boundaries does not only pertain to a misreading of specific 
topographical positions, but rather to a basic difference in the very con-
ceptual shape or mode of the delimitation mechanisms respectively.
To conclude about the delimitations of “the aesthetic” and thus of aes-
thetics – and I should add that the argument here is an extremely con-
densed version of my book on the aesthetic relation which has been 
published in Danish earlier this year (2008): The limits of the aesthetic 
as a phenomenon are complex, transitory, and basically inherent in the 
objects, taking the shape of a dispositional or virtual property. Aesthetic 
qualities might be characterized as belonging to an “immanence plane” – 
un plan d’immanence (which is Deleuze/Guattari’s concept from Qu’est­ce 
que la Philosophie).
So “the aesthetic” deals with a specific kind of relations, pertaining in 
principle to any objectual, situational entity taking up an objectual posi-
tion. I.e., we live in a world of immense quantities of actual and virtual 
aesthetic objects (plus quite a few historically proven, having entered the 
archives of aesthetic relations). The quality of being aesthetic, however, is 
not exhaustive, it is generally reversible, and it is certainly not exclusive 
in comparison to other relational and objectual qualities.
Aesthetics, being the discipline studying these aesthetic relations, 
should obey general rules of probability, argument, and truth proving – 
like any other branch of Wissenschaft in a continental sense. The discipline 
of aesthetics consequently possesses no privilege to pronounce judgments 
of taste. To adapt, to confirm, and to realise this decisive distinction be-
tween the nature of the object of study and the nature of the scholarly ap-
proach might indeed constitute a becoming-modern of aesthetics. Finally, 
one might add.
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